Calgary ended
at zero.
Norway kept
the learning.

The convenient version says Calgary created Olympiatoppen. The evidence is subtler. Olympiatoppen dates Project 88 from 1984 and the permanent organisation from 1989; Store norske leksikon places the transition in 1988. The exact boundary differs, but the sequence holds: a temporary Olympic initiative came first; a permanent cross-sport institution followed.

Calgary revealed the limits of mobilising expertise around one deadline. Federations kept responsibility for their sports, while Olympiatoppen gained authority to challenge, support and connect them—a meeting place across disciplines rather than a headquarters taking over performance.

Many transformations face the same constraint. A new ERP, planning model or data ambition is visible in the steering committee. Underneath, the same specialists must protect service, design the future, test it and teach colleagues. Learning time disappears first.

The Norwegian model separates decision rights without isolating learning. Federations remain accountable for athletes and programmes. Olympiatoppen supplies expertise, research, facilities, coach development and challenge that smaller sports could not easily recreate.

The present-day OLT coach leads the relationship with a prioritised sport and coordinates multidisciplinary support around its director or national coach. Specialist depth enters daily work without displacing local accountability.

Learning continues after success. In Svein S. Andersen’s account, congratulations after rower Olaf Tufte’s second Olympic gold were followed by a review of what had not gone to plan. Olympiatoppen and NTNU’s Topptrener programme similarly joins practice, theory and cross-sport networks. Knowledge returns to coaching through people.

The structure may be called a transformation office, a PMO, a centre of excellence, Operational Excellence or another specialist team. Its name matters less than the conditions in which it works. It needs a clear mandate, access to decision-makers, budget and enough time to visit operational teams, follow the process and understand why work happens as it does. This is an investment: it allows separate transformation efforts to learn from one another and move in the same direction.

Governance remains necessary. Progress must be visible, obstacles escalated and value measured. Yet a function absorbed by reporting gradually loses contact with the work it is expected to change. The strongest teams spend time observing decisions and handoffs, testing ideas with the people involved and learning from contained mistakes. Research on effective transformation offices reaches a similar conclusion: mandate, action and a shared factual view matter more than the production of status material.

The development of Customer Supply Chain teams offers one concrete example. Large corporations increasingly want to become more customer centric, and these teams can connect that ambition to the reality of an end-to-end supply chain.

Voice-of-customer interviews are useful, but they are not enough. A Customer Supply Chain team must meet the customer, visit its operations and show interest in the details: how orders are placed, how inventory is managed, how promotions affect demand and how exceptions are resolved. Following a real order or a launch through the customer’s supply chain often reveals more than another survey. It also creates the basis for a roadmap designed with the customer rather than interpreted from a distance.

The same curiosity is required internally. The team needs to accompany Commercial and Marketing in the field, understand the promise being made and help secure the handoff into Planning, Customer Service, Logistics and Operations. This gives operational constraints a place early in the discussion, while there is still time to improve the idea. Direct access to data and tools is essential: evidence allows the team to test established assumptions and identify gaps before they become explanations.

I have seen how quickly an end-to-end intention can narrow when such a team is positioned too close to one operational service line. The proximity can be useful, but the wider organisation may begin to treat the team as an extension of that function. Local initiatives then progress without using the connecting capability that already exists. Results may still appear, although they remain local, are difficult to reproduce and gradually weaken the discipline of the shared roadmap. Senior management sees the initiatives that were delivered more easily than the value that could have travelled.

The answer is not to centralise every decision. It is to give the transformation function legitimate access to the places where end-to-end choices are made. For Customer Supply Chain, this may mean close connection with IBP leadership and the broader supply-chain executive agenda. In another context, the route will be different. The principle remains the same: local teams retain responsibility, while the transformation function connects their decisions, learning and capabilities.

An integrated transformation function starts creating true value when it is empowered to connect teams end to end around a common vision of the future. Its effort should go into bridging what remains invisible between functions, rather than fighting for visibility of its own.